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This paper argues that unemployment insurance increases labor productivity by encouraging
workers to seek higher productivity jobs, and by encouraging firms to create those jobs. We
use a quantitative general equilibrium model to investigate whether this effect is comparable
in magnitude to the standard moral hazard effects of unemployment insurance (UI). Our
results indicate that a decrease in the generosity of UI from its current U.S. level would not
only decrease welfare but also reduce the level of output.
Most analyses of unemployment insurance focus on its consumption-smoothing and risk-
sharing roles. For example, Gruber (1997) finds that workers who receive more generous
unemployment benefits experience a smaller drop in consumption following the loss of a
job. Standard approaches to unemployment insurance compare this benefit with the adverse
moral hazard effects, and compute the optimal amount of UI by equating marginal costs and
benefits (Shavell and Weiss 1979, Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997).
While this tradeoff is likely to be important, UI could also affect the type of jobs that
workers look for and accept.' This is the effect of UI that we emphasize. According to
the theory we develop, in a risk-averse economy without any UI, workers avoid the risk of
unemployment by applying to low productivity jobs that are easier to obtain. Firms offer
implicit insurance to workers by opening jobs with low unemployment risk, and charging
an insurance premium in the form of lower wages. The resulting composition of jobs is
inefficient and can he improved by a moderate level of unemployment insurance, which
encourages workers to take on more risk, and increases not only welfare hut also the level of
output. (see also Acemoglu and Shimer 1999a).
Although this effect is qualitatively reasonable, a major goal of this paper is to show
that it is likely to be quantitatively important as well. In a realistic environment, it must
outweigh two significant forces. First, unemployment insurance will encourage workers to
reduce their search effort, lowering employment and output. Second, workers can self-insure
by saving, considerably reducing the need for unemployment insurance.
To address these issues, we consider a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium economy.
Workers are risk averse, with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). They optimally choose
their consumption, labor supply, and search effort while unemployed. Unfortunately this
'In the data, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) find that workers who receive niore UI find lugher wage jobs.
On the other hand, Meyer (1989) finds no evidence that more generous UI results in higher earnings for
covered workers. His estimates have large standard errors, however, and cannot rule out substantial earnings
effects.
1model cannot be solved analytically,2 because the workers' optimal policy (their consumption,
labor supply, and search rules) depends on their wealth level, which is itself determined by
the optimal policy. We therefore undertake a calibration exercise, anchoring our model to
plausible preferences and to the unemployment rate and unemployment insurance system
faced by U.S. workers with a high school degree. With a coefficient of relative risk aversion
of four, a replacement rate a little below fifty percent for six months, and productivity
differences between good and bad jobs on the order of 30%, our model generates levels of
unemployment, the consumption drop upon job loss, and low-frequency income variability
similar to those found in U.S. data.
Moderate increases in the replacement rate or the duration of unemployment benefits
lead to increases in unemployment duration similar to those observed in the U.S. economy.
For example, Meyer (1989) finds that a 10 percent increase in unemployment benefits raises
unemployment duration by about a week, while Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) and Atkinson
and I\4icklewright (1991) estimate a slightly smaller response. At the same time, the policy
change raises average wages by about 1.2 percent, which is a substantial effect, but still
somewhat less than the gains reported by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976). The overall effect
of the policy change is therefore to raise output and welfare by a little over half a percent.
The result that economies with moderate UI have higher output and welfare than economies
without social insurance is very robust. Increasing the value of leisure, reducing risk aversion,
reducing the wage gap between different types of jobs, and allowing on-the-job search does
not alter this conclusion, although it does sometimes affect whether the output-maximizing
replacement rate is above or below U.S. levels.
Our paper is related to a number of previous studies. As mentioned above, we build
on Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a). Other papers have also pointed out beneficial effects of
UI, inter alia Diamond (1981), Acemoglu (1998), and Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). For
example, Acemoglu shows that UI may improve welfare by encouraging workers to wait for
higher capital jobs that pay higher wages because of holdup problems. Marimon and Zilibotti
emphasize matching between workers and firms according to comparative advantage, and
show that UI encourages workers to wait for jobs better suited to them. All these papers
consider risk-neutral agents, however, so unemployment benefits are simply a subsidy to
search. Our approach differs in explicitly modeling risk aversion and precautionary saving,
and in contrasting the beneficial effects of UI with its conventional costs. We are not aware
of any other study that has compared these costs and benefits in such a realistic setting.
Other studies, including Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Atke-
2Iii Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a), we provided closed form solutions for the case with constant absolute
risk aversion. In tIns paper, we use the more coaventional CRRA preferences, winch imply that poorer
workers may be unwilling to accept gambles that richer workers find attractive. The utility cost of low
consumption is also much larger with CRRA preferences, increasing the precautionary savings motive.
2son and Lucas (1995), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and analyze optimal unemployment
insurance with asymmetric information, but do not model labor market search. Costain
(1996) and Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (1997) examine labor market behavior in a
qnantitative general equilibrium framework, but do not look at the productivity gains from
unemployment insurance.
Our emphasis on the importance of uniusured risk may appear to contradict the findings
of Krusell and Smith (1998), that wealth heterogeneity does not have an important effect
on the behavior of aggregate macroeconomic variables. There are at least two significant
differences between our environment and theirs, however. First, in Krusell and Smith's (1998)
economy, agents only affect macroeconomic outcomes through their savings decisions. Since
poor agents own very little of the aggregate capital stock, nonlinearities in their behavior
have little effect on agggregate variables. Tn our model, poor agents have a first order effect
on aggregate income through their search and labor supply decisions. And second, we also
focus on the welfare implications of wealth heterogeneity Again, such a calculation gives
eqnal weight to poor workers, in contrast to the impact on aggregate consumption.
2 Static Model
To illustrate the qualitative benefits of UI, we start with a simple static model. There is a
continuum 1 of identical workers, each with the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
U(c, h) over final consumption c and work hours, h. U satisfies standard assumptions: it
is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in c, and weakly concave. For now, we
restrict Ii =Ii,so u(c) =U(c,h), but variations in hours will play an important role in the
quantitative dynamic model.
A worker's consumption is the sum of her initial assets A, plus her net labor income y.
Depending on whether she finds a job, her income will either be equal to her wage w net of
proportional UT taxes r, or to her unemployment benefit b.
There is a larger continuum of potential firms, each with access to the same production
technology. Each firm can open a job with 'specificity' a fi [0, 1] which then produces g(a)
units of output when filled. A job with higher a produces more output, so g is an increasing
function. However, a high a job is also harder to fill. In particular, it requires a better
match between the firm and its employee, so the probability that a random worker possesses
the skills and abilities required for a job of specificity a is given by the decreasing function
M(a). Moreover, these specific skills are 'inspection' goods; workers do not know before
applying for the job whether they will be a good fit.
Workers and firms come together via search. The timing of events is as follows. At the
beginning of each period, each firm decides whether to open a job. Those that open a job
incur a cost 'y >0.An active firm jthenchooses its specificity a and posts a wage w.
3Each worker observes all the wage offers and associated specificities, and decides where to
apply for a job. In a pure strategy equilibrium, each worker applies to a different job, and
each job has one applicant.3 After the matching stage, the pair learns whether the worker
has the requisite skills. If she doesn't, both remain unmatched. If she does, the pair produce
g(a).
In equilibrium, each firm that creates a job chooses a specificity a and wage w that will
attract a worker and maximize its profit. Also, profits are driven to zero by the free entry
condition. Thus, an equilibrium specificity-wage combination (a, w) must solve4
max M(a)u(A + (1- r)w)+(1- M(a))u(A + b) (1)
subject to M(a)(g(a) —w)￿ 'y
That is, an equilibrium (a, w) has to maximize the expected utility of a worker, subject to
the constraint that the firm makes zero profits. Otherwise, a firm could offer (a', w') that
yields higher utility to workers who apply, while ensuring positive expected profits for itself.5
This problem can be represented in a conventional two dimensional diagram, as in Fig-
ure 1. The objective is a downward sloping function in (a, w) space, as workers prefer higher
wages and less specific jobs. On the other hand, firms prefer lower wages, and face a tradeoff
regarding specificity: higher specificity makes it more difficult to hire a worker, but also raises
productivity upon hiring a worker. The non-monotonic shape of the constraint highlights
that tradeoff.
An alternative representation is obtained by solving the constraint for the lowest speci-
ficity consistent with a particular wage and zero profits, a(w). Substitute this into the
matching function to obtain m(w) M(a(w)). This simplifies the characterization of equi-
librium to:
max m(w)u(A + (1- jw) + (1- m(w))u(A + b). (2)
3There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium in which there is more competition for sonic jobs than for
others, see Peters (1991), Montgomery (1991), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (1997), or Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999b). In such an equilibrium, matching probabilities are determined by the relative supply of workers
seeking and jobs offering each specificity-wage combination. We simplify the analysis here by ignoring the
mixed strategy equilibrium and the corresponding analysis of market tightness.
4The equilibrium of this model need not be unique, even with homogeneous workers and cx anteidentical
firms. Nevertheless, workers have the same utility in any equilibrium; and more importantly, the comparative
statics given below hold across the setofequilibria. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) prove this result and the
generic uniqueness of equilibrium in a more general model.
5A potential issue is why firms do not offer insurance by promising payments to applicants who are not
well-suited to the job. In practice, there a number of reasons why this may not he feasible. First, such
promises may be non-credible if firms can declare bankruptcy. Second, they may create adverse selection
problems, attracting workers who are lower ability, hence unlikely to be suited to the job. Third, they may
create moral hazard problems, as workers attempt to understate their suitability.
4This form of the problem is convenient, because it emphasizes the parallel between our for-
mulation and that of Lucas and Prescott (1974), in which workers search across a set of
exogenously given wages. In our problem, wages are determined by firms' profit maximiza-
tion, but since neither assets nor the level of unemployment insurance affect firms' profits
directly, this added complication is not essential for the results.
Comparative statics with respect to unemployment benefits and asset levels are now
straightforward. In terms of the problem in (1), the asset level and unemployment benefit
only affect the objective function. Hence comparative statics can be conducted only by
tracing the movements of the indifference contours. (In terms of (2), they do not affect
the function rn(w).) An increase in the unemployment benefit makes workers more willing
to seek higher wages and more specific jobs, flattening the indifference curves. Therefore,
when unemployment income increases, the tangency point shifts up and to the right, as in
Figure 2. Equilibrium wages increase, and workers seek jobs requiring more specific skills
(see Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) for more details). Intuitively, without UI, workers are
unwilling to apply for specific jobs, because these jobs entail too much unemployment risk. UI
makes workers more willing to endure the possibility of unemployment. This unambiguously
increases labor productivity and unemployment.
Attitudes towards risk have a similar impact on behavior. Less risk-averse workers are
more willing to accept a tradeoff of higher unemployment risk for a higher wage. That is, a
less risk averse worker has a flatter indifference curve. Again, this shifts the tangency point
up and to the right, raising wages and increasing specificity. Intuitively, risk-averse workers
dislike the risk of unemployment, and so are willing to pay an insurance premium to firms,
in the form of lower wages, in return for a higher employment probability Firms provide
this insurance by reducing job specificity
A change in the level of assets affects the equilibrium by altering workers' attitude towards
risk. With constant relative risk aversion, the most common preferences used in macro
models and the one that we will use in our quantitative exercise, richer workers have lower
absolute risk aversion. As a result, they are more willing to accept employment gambles,
compared to poorer workers. They apply to higher wage jobs with higher unemployment
risk. We will see that in the dynamic model, this will create a natural source of persistence
in individual wealth levels.
We can also show that in an economy without unemployment insurance, risk-averse
workers will apply to jobs with too little specificity. Moderate levels of UI will not only
improve risk-sharing, but also increase the level of output in the economy The simplest
way to see this is to consider an economy where all agents have the same level of assets
A. As a method of proof, consider first an economy in which agents are risk-neutral and
have no UI, b == 0.From (2), we see that the equilibrium of this economy maximizes
m(w)w, total output. Since we know that an economy with more risk-averse agents has
5lower wages and less job specificity, it is necessarily "inefficient" (i.e. fails to maximize
output). Introducing UI raises wages and specificity A moderate level of UI will return
the productive sector back to the output maximizing allocation. At the same time, it raises
workers' payoff while unemployed, reducing risk and raising utility. This beneficial effect
of unemployment insurance obviously ignores the 'standard' moral hazard effect on search
effort. The dynamic model introduces these adverse effects, and investigates whether, for
plausible parameterizations, the beneficial effects outlined here outweigh the standard costs.
3 Dynamic Model
We now consider our full dynamic model, which contains the benefits of UI demonstrated in
the previous section, but also incorporates moral hazard, precautionary savings, and later,
on-the-job search.
Workers are infinitely lived, and maximize expected utility, which depends on consump-







o is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, /3 is the discount factor, it is workers' endowment
of time, and ij is the relative valne of leisure compared to consumption. When 0 =1,
preferences are logarithmic with u(C, h) = log C + ijlog(h —//3.
Thesestandard preferences ensure that workers' labor supply will be unchanged by ag-
gregate income growth (i.e., along a balanced growth path). This restriction also implies
that when the coefficient of relative risk aversion 0 > 1, an unemployed worker who is forced
to reduce her consumption will have a higher return to leisure, potentially exacerbating the
moral hazard problem created by unemployment insurance.
To simplify the computation of equilibrium, we consider only two types of jobs in this
section, ct, and 0g>0b• Also, since as shown above, the presence of firms is not essential
for the results of interest, we ignore firms and think of these as corresponding to "good"
and "bad" jobs with wages WgtandWbt. As a result, at any point in time, a worker may
be in one of four employment states; she may be employed in a good job at an hourly wage
or employed in a bad job at wage W, or she may be unemployed and either eligible or
ineligible for unemployment benefits B.6 If she is eligible, her labor income }'isequal to
6We assume that the level of unemployment benefits is not tied to a worker's earlier wage. This reflects
the fact that in most countries, the replacement rate falls substantially as earnings increase. It also simplifies
our analysis by reducing the number of state variables. Moreover, by restricting attention to a proportional
labor income tax and a single unemployment benefit level, we stack the cards against finding benefits from
unemployment insurance. Optimal public policy could do better than our calculations suggest.
6her unemployment benefits, )'=B. Otherwise, Y = 0. Employed workers pay taxes at the
rate r that are used to finance the unemployment insurance system, so their labor income
is=(1 —T)htW0tor (1 —r)htWbtwhere h is their hours of work.
The worker then faces a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints:
= R(A + } —Ci). (4)
are the assets at the start of period t. These increase with her labor income Y and
decrease with consumption C. R is the exogenous gross rate of return on risk-free bonds,
the only asset in the economy.7 Workers may buy and sell bonds, subject only to the solvency
constraint that their debt cannot explode. However, there is always a positive probability of
being unemployed and ineligible for unemployment benefits for any arbitrarily long period of
time. If that happens, any level of debt will explode. Thus the solvency constraint prevents
indebtedness, A ￿ 0.
Next consider the transition of workers between employment states. An unemployed
worker finds a job at a rate proportional to the number of hours she searches h.5 The
proportionality constant depends on whether she looks for good jobs (m9) or bad jobs (nib).
Conversely,good and bad jobs end exogenously according to a Poisson process with arrival
rates 80 and 8b,respectively,leaving the worker unemployed but eligible for unemployment
insurance. A worker in turn loses her eligibility with probability in each period that she is
unemployed, so the expected unemployment benefit duration is 1/ periods. However, any
employment spell restores her eligibility Finally a worker may voluntarily quit a job at any
time, in which case she is ineligible for benefits.
We assume productivity grows at a constant rate F >1,so F_tW9t and wb
F_tWbt. Unemploymentbenefits grow at the same rate, with bF_tBt. Under these
conditions, there is a balanced growth path, in which a worker's consumption and leisure
decisions only depend on her employment state and on her normalized asset level atF_tAt,
and the government budget is balanced at each point in time.
We characterize the equilibrium using Bellman equations. Consider first the expected




30(A) = max + j3((i —89)39,1+i(A+1)+ 893,±1(A+1)) 1—6
71n an earlier version of this paper, we endogenized the return on bonds, and found that it had little
effect on our results. In any case, we will parameterize the model to describe the behavior of workers with
a high school diploma. Such workers own a tiny fraction of the aggregate capital stock, and so a change in
the unemployment insnrance system for these workers will have little effect on the real interest rate (Krusell
and Smith 1998).
5For now, we assume employed workers cannot search. We introduce on-the-job search in Section 5.4,
with little effect on the results.
7where A+1 is next period's assets. The value of a good job comes
from the utility of current consumption and leisure plus the continuation value, which is the
probability that the job is exogenously terminated, 8, times the value of an unemployed,
insured worker 3,t+i(A+i), plus (1 —8)times the value of a good job next period.
Let atF_tAt, ctF_tCt, and J(at)F_(l_o)t3(A), x E {g,i}. Our balanced
growth assumption yield an autonomous Bellman equation:
(c(h -
J9(a)=max
1 —9+ fiF'8((i —89)J9(a÷) +S9Jt(a+)) (5)
where a (R/F)(a + (1 —r)hw9
—c)is next period's normalized assets. Notice that the
growth rate of productivity acts to reduce the discount factor (if 9 > 1) and the interest
rate, thereby raising desired consumption today The autonomous Bellman equation for bad
jobs is identical, except that these workers may also choose to quit.
For employed workers, the relationship between consumption and hours is given by a
static first order condition:
(6)
where w is the current wage rate. The left hand side is the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, while the right hand side is the relative price of leisure, the
after-tax wage. Workers will work more hours when consumption is lower or the after-tax
wage is higher. Thus we expect to see poor workers in good jobs working the hardest in
this economy In addition, if employed workers approximately consume their after-tax labor
income, c(1 —r)hw,then they will supply about hh/(1 + r) hours of labor. This
explains why we interpret ijasthe value of leisure.




+/3F1_Omax(mghJg(a+) + (1— m9h)J(a+), c,h 1 —9
mbhJo(a+) + (1 —mbh)Ju(a+))(7)
where a =(R/F)(a
—c).The first term gives their current utility, while the second
term is the continuation value, discounted to account both for impatience and growth. An
unemployed worker must choose whether to seek a good job or a bad one. This affects the
job finding rate as well as the continuation value upon finding a job. The Bellman equation
for insured workers has the same structure, but adds a term to allow for the possibility of
losing benefit eligibility, and adds benefits to the asset accumulation equation.
84 Computation of Benchmark Equilibrium
This section describes a calibrated version the model, choosing parameters in line with U.S.
datafor workers with exactly a high school degree, approximately forty percent of the U.S.
labor force. We focns on this education category because it is relatively homogeneous, and
our model presumes that all workers have the same "skill level". In addition, these workers
save less,9 yet suffer more unemployment than their more educated peers. This means that
they are less likely to do a good job of self-insuring against labor income shocks, and more
likely to benefit from unemployment insurance programs. In the next section, we report
robustness results from changing the key parameter values.
4.1 Parameterization
We interpret a period to he a week, in order to have some hope of capturing the multitude
of very short duration unemployment spells; on average, over 40 percent of unemployed
workers in the U.S. have been unemployed for less than five weeks. We normalize the time
endowment to ft =1and the maximum weekly wage in a bad job to Wb=1. We then must
choose the following parameters:
• the interest rate R.
• Technology parameters: the productivity growth rate F; the wage in good jobs w9;the
destrnction rates 6 and S; and the matching rates nibandm9.
• Preference parameters: the discount rate /3; the coefficient of relative risk aversion 9;
and the relative value of leisure ij.
•Policy parameters: unemployment benefit level b; and the exhaustion rate of benefits
In addition, the tax rate r must balance the government budget.'°
We set the gross interest rate to I? = 1.0006 per week, which corresponds to an annual
interest rate of 3.2%, approximately the real return on 10-year treasury bonds over the past
9High school graduates who are less than 40 years old have very low levels of liquid assets. According
to the PSID, the median level of financial wealth (bank accounts, stocks, and bonds) excluding debt was
$700 for this group in 1984. It rose to $1200 by 1989 and $1325 in 1993. Older workers generally have more
assets, in large part because of their retirement savings. Since our model does not have retirement, we focus
on data for younger workers without a lifecycle savings motive, 'We thank Aanette Vissing-Jorgensen for
providing us with these numbers.
'°The budget balancing tax rate is generically not unique, due to 'Laffer curve' reasoning. A very high tax
rate chokes off most production, leading to a high unemployment balanced budget equilibrium. We always
look for the lowest tax rate consistent with a balanced budget.
9ten years (IMF 1995). This is the interest rate used in other calibrations of precautionary
savings models (e.g. Gouriuchas and Parker 1997). The growth rate is F =1.0003per week,
or 1.6% per year, which matches the average growth rate of labor productivity from 1960—96
(OECD 1997).
We set the wage in a specialized job to be 30% higher than the wage in an unspecialized
job, w9 =1.3.This yields a wage differential between specialized and unspecialized jobs
approximately equal to the difference between average wages in the manufacturing and retail
sectors (See Tables 1 and 2 in Krueger and Summers 1988)11
We assume that all jobs are destroyed with 0.5% probability per week, 8 == 0.005.
These numbers are in line with the flows reported by Poterba and Summers (1986), who find
a monthly rate of 0.019 (see their Table 5)12
We set the matching rate in9 and m6 to be consistent with two facts. First, the equilibrium
unemployment rate should be approximately equal to the unemployment rate among high
school graduates over the age of 25 in the U.S., which averaged 6.4% from 1979 to 1997.
This pins down the 'average' matching rate. Second, Krueger and Summers (1988) report
that the observed standard deviation of log wages is about 0.13. In order to achieve this in
our model, with w9 =l.3w'b,about half of employment must be in specialized jobs, and half
in unspecialized jobs. This will only happen if unspecialized jobs are sufficiently easier to
get, that is the difference between in9 and inb is relatively large, so that poor (hence more
risk-averse) workers are willing to search for them. In our baseline specification, the fraction
of specialized jobs is indeed about 50%.
Our choices of the preference parameters 3 and 0 are motivated by two facts. First, high
school graduates maintain very low levels of financial wealth (see footnote 9), despite the
relatively large income risk that they face. This implies that they must be quite impatient, so
we set the weekly discount factor at /1 =0.998,about 0.9 at annual frequencies. This is lower
than the typical discount factors used in business cycle analyses, but fairly conventional in
the precautionary savings literature. For example, Deatou (1991) uses a 10% discount rate
in his simulations, arguing as we do, that this is necessary to justify the number of workers
with low asset levels in the presence of liquidity constraints. Carroll and Samwick (1997)
argue that one requires a discount rate of about 11% in order to rationalize the fact that the
size of agents' precautionary wealth 'buffer stocks' are fairly insensitive to the extent of their
'1Krueger and Summers (1988) and Gibbons and Katz (1992) find that workers that change industry
obtain approximately the same wage change as the cross-sectional difference (see, for example, Table 5 in
Krueger and Summers 1988). Nevertheless, some of the interindustry wage differences are likely still due to
unobserved worker heterogeneity. For this reason, we do not use the largest differentials in the data. The
differential between sectors such as tobacco, petroleum, chemicals, on the one hand, and retail, on the other,
is on the order of 50 percent.
12These rates are lower than the worker turnover rates reported by Anderson and Meyer (1994), because
we are concerned only with movement from employment to unemployment.
10income uncertainty This level of impatience is enough to moderate the precautionary savings
motive. Second, workers smooth their consumption quite well (Gruber 1997), despite the
relatively low levels of assets. This implies that they must have a low intertemporal elasticity
of substitution 1/0. Thns we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion at 9 =4,slightly
higher than usual, but once again in line with parameters used in the precautionary savings
literature.
We choose the value of leisure as = 1/6. According to equation (6), an employed
worker who consumes her after-tax income (1 —r)/iw, will work about h/(i + ij)=0.86
hours. Interpreting the maximum feasible work week /itobe 45 hours, workers supply about
38 hours of labor each week. This elasticity is lower than conventionally used (Hansen 1985).
\xrith a higher elasticity of leisure, unemployed workers who are eligible for unemployment
insurance will actually consume less than ineligble workers, but offset this with much more
leisure. This implausible result follows from the fact that labor and leisure are substitutes and
is clearly counterfactual. Studies such as Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) do not encounter
this problem because they assume that all unemployed workers allocate all their time to
leisure, but receive job offers at an exogenous rate.
Finally, we parameterize unemployment insurance to match U.S. policy. To get an av-
erage benefit duration of six months, we set the probability that a worker's benefits will
be exhausted at 4% per week, = 0.04. We set the unemployment benefit b = 0.4 in our
benchmark model. Since we find that employed workers set their hours to about 0.85, tlus
is about 47% of the wage in bad jobs, and 36% of the wage in good jobs. This matches the
evidence on 1987 post-income tax replacement rates in Table Al of Gruber (1998), that the
replacement rate is slightly less than fifty percent.
Although we choose the technology and preference parameters to match a similar number
of pieces of evidence, below we also report a number of other statistics that are implied by
our model and can be compared with the data. Most of these results appear to be in line
with the evidence, even though the calibration was not designed to match these facts. These
can be interpreted as a test of the 'over-identifying' restrictions implied by our numerical
exercise.
4.2 Numerical Methodology
We calculate the optimal policy using backward induction. Begin with a conjecture for the
Bellman functions. Then at each step, calculate the optimal policy on a grid of asset levels
for workers in each different employment state.'3 Note that workers are not constrained to
13We compute the optimal policy at about 400 asset levels, concentrating particularly on time more curved
region of the policy function, with low asset levels. More precisely, we calculate the policy at points in the set
{1.01" —1}for n E{0,1,... ,N},where N is large enough that in equilibrium no one wants to save beyond
that point. This grid is much more dense than is standard in many other calibration exercises. However, we
11choose asset levels from that grid. Instead, we can calculate new value fuuctions using a
linear interpolation. This process converges to yield the Bellman and policy functions on a
balanced growth path.
In order to do this calculation, we must specify the tax rate. However, it is endogenously
determined in equilibrium to balance the government budget. Whether this happens depends
on the ergodic distribution of workers across asset and employment states, which can in
turn be simulated from the policy functions calculated in the first stage. This makes the
equilibrium tax rate the solution to a fixed point problem.
Moreover, calculating the government budget surplus is extremely time consuming, since
it requires calculating the ergodic distribution of workers across states. Even though the
cross-sectional dispersion of asset holdings is relatively small (for example, in our baseline
parameterization, no one maintains more than 37 units of assets), asset holdings are very per-
sistent (see Figure 6 and the accompanying discussion). This limits the number of significant
figures in our reported results.
4.3 Benchmark Results
The policy functions in the benchmark parameterization are well-behaved. Wealthy workers
look for good jobs and poor workers look for bad ones. For insured workers, the critical
threshold for (normalized) assets, above which they apply to good jobs, is approximately 4
(times their weekly income in bad jobs). Uninsured workers start looking for bad jobs when
their assets fall below 9.
Figure 3 shows that workers in good jobs consume more than workers in bad ones,
and employed workers consume more than unemployed workers, conditional on their assets.
However, uninsured workers sometimes consume more than insured workers at intermediate
asset levels. This pattern arises because insured workers choose to enjoy a lot of leisure and
low consumption (Figure 4), especially when they seek good jobs where the marginal value
of an additional hour of search is relatively low. Similarly, unemployed workers who receive
benefits raise their consumption when their assets fall so low that they begin to apply to
bad jobs.
More generally, Figure 4 shows that hours are a fairly complicated function of the worker's
state. While employed, richer workers enjoy more consumption and more leisure. Workers in
good jobs typically work longer hours as they take advantage of this temporarily high wage
by intertemporal substitution. For unemployed workers, hours depend on the type of job
that they seek, with the lowest search effort for unemployed workers near the threshold of
applying for bad jobs. In any case, there is little variability in labor supply, with a maximum
found that with less dense grids, workers incorrectly become too concerned about low asset levels, and thus
save too much.
12range of 0.78—0.92.'
Workers consumption and search patterns give rise to an ergodic distribution of asset
holdings (Figure 5). This is both the cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings in a
large economy, and the time-series distribution of asset holdings for one individual. The
distribution is skewed, because at any point in time, about half the workers are in bad jobs,
where they maintain very low asset holdings. Because it is easy to regain another bad job
following the loss of one, asset levels cannot fall too far. The other half of the workers are in
good jobs, where they have substantial precautionary savings. Many of these achieve quite
high asset levels. However, upon losing a good job, it takes many periods to find another
one, during which time the assets are run down rapidly.
The first column in Table 2 summarizes other results from the benchmark model. A
balanced budget requires a 2.2% labor income tax rate, and yields a mean asset level 16.5
times the wage in bad jobs. The next four lines show some results that the parameterization
was chosen to match. About half the jobs are good, yielding a 6.3% unemployment rate,
or conversely an average unemployment duration of a quarter year. The standard deviation
of weekly labor income also matches the 0.13 number reported by Krueger and Summers
(1988).
The following four lines give the average working and searching hours for workers in
different employment states. As indicated above, uninsured workers have the least leisure,
while insured workers enjoy the most. Employed workers fall somewhere in between. Again,
there is very little variation in hours.
The next two lines report the first two "over-identifying restrictions". First we calculate
the immediate drop in consumption for an average worker following the loss of her job. We
can see from Figure 3 that this varies considerably with asset level and job type. On average,
it is 15.2% in the benchmark model. This is somewhat higher than Gruber's (1997) estimate
of an eight percent decline in food consumption for high school graduates at this replacement
rate. Since food consumption is more inelastic than overall consumption, however, our
estimate is plausible.
In order to check the implications of our model for low frequency income variability, we
calculate the standard deviation of log annual income. Notice that this is different from the
standard deviation of weekly income for two reasons: It includes workers who are unemployed
for part or all of the year, and it aggregates income to an annual level. The second difference is
quite important, for if income fluctuations were completely transitory, the standard deviation
of annual income would be quite small. Our benchmark model delivers a standard deviation
of 0.17, only slightly smaller than Carroll and Samwick's (1997) estimate of 0.19 for all U.S.
14Since poorer workers are more likely to search harder and to look for bad jobs, tile model predicts that
the exit rate from unemployment is generally lower for richer workers, which appears couaterfactual. In
practice, this may be because richer workers have better job opportunities due to unobserved heterogeneity.
13workers, or 0.20 for workers with a high school diploma (see their Table 1). This shows that
our model generates persistence in individual income, at annual frequencies, in line with the
patterns in the data, despite the transitory nature of shocks.
To further understand this point, it helps to look at a typical 10,000week(192 year)
sample path for an individual's assets (Figure 6). Asset holdings are extremely persistent.
There are long periods during which the individual maintains low asset levels and takes had
jobs, and other periods when she is luckier and so is able to save more and work in good
jobs. In this particular example, the individual spends the middle 2000 weeks (48 years)
primarily in bad jobs. But in the last 4000 weeks, she never takes a bad job.
The last four rows of Table 2 summarize productivity and welfare in this economy. We
give four measures: the average wage; total output (hence consumption); total leisure; and
the welfare of an average worker at any point in time. Welfare is measured as the level of
consumption that must be given to a worker to make her indifferent between consuming this
without having to work at all, and participating in the labor market as in the model.
4.4 Changes in Unemployment Insurance Policy
The remaining columns of Table 2 give the results from three policy changes. These are
useful both because they enable ns to check whether our model generates plausible increases
in unemployment duration and wages in response to more generous UI policy, and because
they will show whether moderate levels of UI can raise productivity, output, and welfare.
In Column II, we raise the level of unemployment benefits by ten percent. This raises
the mean unemployment duration by exactly one week, which agrees precisely with Meyer's
(1989) estimated response, and is somewhat larger than Atkinson and Micklewright's (1991)
conclusion from their literature survey, that a ten percentage point increase in the replace-
ment rate will raise unemployment duration by about six percent. It also raises the average
wage rate by 1.2%, a smaller response than Ehrenberg and Oaxaca's (1976) estimate of a
seven percent increase in wages in response to a 25 percent increase in unemployment ben-
efits. In Column III, we rednce the benefit exhaustion rateby ten percent, resulting in a
2.8 week increase in unemployment benefits. This leads to a half week increase in unemploy-
ment duration, which is consistent with Katz and Meyer's (1990) estimate that a one week
increase in the duration of benefits will raise unemployment duration by 0.16 to 0.20 weeks.
Overall, our model performs quite well in these "tests of over-identifying restrictions", which
gives us some confidence in evaluating its implications regarding the impact of UI policy on
outpnt and welfare.
In both cases, the primary reason for the increase in the unemployment rate and unem-
ployment duration is the change in the types of jobs that workers seek. In fact, there is very
little change in search effort. Therefore, our analysis suggests that a large part of what is
14measured as moral hazard, may be driven by the willingness of better-insured workers to seek
higher wage jobs. This is reflected in the last four rows of the table, which show the increase
in wages and cousumptiou resulting from the increase iu the share of good jobs. Leisure,
ou the other hand, is virtually unchauged, and as a result, per capita output rises sharply
in response to either policy experiment. Utility similarly increases, as workers benefit both
from the reduction in risk and from the increase in productivity
We point out two other results from these experiments. First, the change in the UI
scheme has very little effect on mean asset holdings, justifying our partial equilibrium anal-
ysis. In fact, more generous UI actually induces more savings, as more workers prepare to
undertake the risky search for good jobs. Second, there is one dimension in which our model
does not perform particularly well: Gruber (1997) estimates that an increase in the replace-
ment rate results in a smaller decline in consumption following job loss. In our model, the
consumption decline (surprisingly) increases. Again, this occurs because workers prepare for
longer unemployment spells.
Finally, the fourth column of Table 2 shows the results of eliminating all UI in our
benchmark economy. These results should be interpreted cautiously, since they are based
on estimates that are well 'out-of-sample'. Nevertheless, the qualitative behavior of such an
economy is instructive. No worker looks for a good job, resulting in very low unemployment
and wage dispersion. However, the resulting productivity loss implies a substantial output
and welfare reduction.
4.5 Discussion
How large are the productivity and welfare gains from UI in this economy? Our results
indicate that an increase in unemployment benefits that raises UI receipts and expenditures
by 17.6% will lead to a 0.7% increase in output and 0.6% increase in welfare. An increase in
benefit duration that raises receipts and expenditures by 5.6% will lead to a 0.5% increase in
output and 0.4% increase in welfare. According to this metric, the gains are plausibly small.
On another metric, however, the gains appear large. Increasing benefit generosity raises
total expenditures by 0.0035 per worker, but leads to twice as large an increase in output.
Increasing benefit duration raises total benefit expenditures by 0.0011, and leads to about
four times as large an increase in output. This suggests substantial returns to raising the
size of the UI system.
These findings should be interpreted with caution, however. Our results are "local", in
the sense that we use U.S. observations to pin down parameters, and we have the most
confidence in our results for small deviations from the U.S. benchmark.'5 At least two sets
15This is why we do not investigate the implications of increasing UI generosity from the U.S. to European
levels.
15of assumptions are suspect when one considers large deviations from the benchmark. First,
the output of good and bad jobs may be imperfect substitutes, so a large increase in the
number of good jobs may reduce productivity and wage differentials across sectors. Second,
our assumption of two job types imposes a linearity on our model economy. Although this
is a valid local approximation when we conduct small policy changes, it is problematic when
there are large changes in UI. For example, an earlier version of the paper showed that with
very generous UI, workers may become "overinsured" and seek out excessively risky jobs.
There are two other important caveats to these results. First, there are distortions
associated with the administration of UI, like the subsidy of temporary layoffs and volatile
employment. This alters the pattern of production towards industries like construction, and
is only partially mitigated by the experience rating of insurance premiums.'6
Finally, the results in Table 2 compare two steady states, and ignore the costs of tran-
sition. In particular, in moving to a system with more generous UI, many workers in bad
jobs must locate good ones, which is a time-consuming process. To obtain a bound on the
adjustment costs, we set the initial distribution of workers at its ergodic distribution across
employment and asset states in the benchmark economy. We then increase the generosity or
duration of benefits and the tax rate to the values indicated in the second and third columns
of Table 2. Utility now increases from 0.651 in the benchmark economy to 0.652 with either
high or long UI instead of 0.654 or 0.655 as in the calculations that ignored the transition
costs. Moreover, the numbers reported here are a lower bound on the welfare gains, because
under this scheme, low unemployment rates in the early years ensure that the government
runs a primary budget surplus, which is never redistributed to the population.
5 Robustness
We consider four robustness checks on our model. First, we raise the relative value of leisure
by a factor of six, to r =1.This increases the importance of traditional moral hazard, as
insured workers choose to cut back more on their job search effort. Then we cut the wage
differential between good and bad jobs in half, tow9 =1.15,reducing the productivity gains
from workers looking for good jobs. Third, we lower the coefficient of relative risk aversion
to 0 =1,which makes utility linear in log consumption and log leisure. Finally, we extend
the model to allow workers employed in bad jobs to look for good jobs. In each case, the
model does not perform as well as the benchmark parameterizatiou along some dimensions.
Still, the robustness checks support our main conclusion, that moderate levels of UI, similar
to those in the U.S., are welfare enhancing.
16lncreasing the experience rating of the UI system is not necessarily an improvement either. A perfectly
experience rated UI system effectively taxes firing, similar to the practice in Europe, and as a result, distorts
jobflowsand matching.
165.1 The Value of Leisure
To investigate the implications of more severe moral hazard problems, weraise the value
of leisure substantially and set it equal to rj =1.To keep hours, hence the replacement
rate, at the same level as our benchmark, we also increasethe available time allotment to
/i =1.7,but do not change the other parameters. Table 3 summarizes the resultsin this
new economy.
The most significant change in results from the benchmark parameterizationis that the
search effort of insured workers declines sharply compared to their uninsured peers.While
previously insured workers searched about six percent lessthan uninsured workers, they now
search 24% less, and consume substantially more leisure.
This traditional moral hazard problem has both positive and normative implications.On
the positive side, unemployment duration now responds too much to changesin UI policy.
This is primarily due to the responsiveness of search effort to unemploymentbenefits. In fact,
the share of good jobs is relatively constant. Additionally, consumptiondeclines by about
fifty percent more than in the benchmark model followingthe loss of a job. This is due to the
substitutability between consumption and leisure, together withthe moral hazard-induced
increase in leisure. In our view, the magnitudes of the decline in consumptionand increase
in unemployment are implausible. These were the main motivationsfor choosing a smaller
value of leisure as the benchmark.
The increase in moral hazard implies that, while the average productof a labor hour
still increases with the generosity of the UI policy, output actuallydeclines slightly in the
neighborhood of the current U.S.system.Welfare, on the other hand, is locally constant,
so that even with this extreme degree of moral hazard,the current system does not reduce
economic welfare. Additionally, both output and welfare are much higherthan they would
be in the absence of any insurance.17
5.2 Wage Dispersion
Reducing the wage gap bet\veen good and bad jobs scarcely changes ourresults. We set
wg =1.15,implying only a 15 percent gap between good and bad jobs.We also reduce
the difference between the job finding rates to mb =0.15and m9 =0.06,which enables us
to maintain a mix of good and bad jobs similar to thebaseline. Table 4 shows that the
results of this parameterization are very similar to the benchmark, except,of course, that
the standard deviations of wages and income decline.
17Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) compute very small benefits of UI when ij =2.However, because
unemployed workers do not search in their model, they do not obtain ourconclusion that consumption is
too variable when the relative value of leisure is high. Our model indicates whysuch high values of ij are
implausible.
17A small increase in unemploymentbenefits or benefit duration still leadsto an increase
in output and welfare, despite the lowerbenefits of obtaining a good job.However, one must interpret this result cautiously, asunemployment duration is not as responsive topolicy in this case as in the data.Correcting this by increasing the value of leisureijwouldreduce the benefits of LTI along the lines ofthe previous robust check.
5.3 Risk Aversion
Our third robustness check is to reducethe coefficient of relative riskaversion all the way to o= 1.This has two effects. First,consumption and leisure are no longer substitutes. And
second, workers are far more willing to endurerisk, which reduces savings considerably and
increases workers' willingness to seek riskieropportunities. In fact, with this sharp decline
in risk aversion, it is difficult toget workers to apply for bad jobs. We thereforemust also
reduce the productivity differential to=1.15and the gap in job finding rates tomb =0.2 and m =0.04.The results are shown in Table 5.
With this change inparameterization, workers have much less desire to smoothconsump- tion, which shows up in the low asset levelsand large decline in consumptionfollowing job loss. Additionally whether workerssearch for good or bad jobs isextremely sensitive to
small changes in UI policy. The usualexperiment of a ten percent increase inunemployment benefits causes a three week increase inunemployment duration, which seems implausible.
Similarly, a 2.8 week increase in benefit durationcauses a one week increase in unemployment
duration, far more than the conventional estimates.
Surprisingly, despite this large increase in unemployment, bothoutput and welfare are slightly higher with themore generous UI
systems. Therefore, our main conclusion, thatmoderate UI increases output andwelfare, is not dependent upon the high degree of riskaversion, although many of the other resultsare less plausible when workers havea degree of relative risk aversion much less than4.
5.4 On-the-Job Search
Perhaps most surprisingly, includingon-the-job search does not affect our main results either.
We incorporate this feature ina natural way by allowing workers in badjobs to search for good ones without first quitting.'8 These workers
spend h hours working, yielding after-tax income (1 —)hwt;h3 hours searching for a good job,yielding transition probability in9h3; and they enjoy h — — Ti8hours of leisure. We keep allparameters as in the benchmark
model. The results are presented in Table6.
15There is no reason in this model forworkers in bad jobs to look for bad jobs,or workers in good jobs to search at all. Undoubtedly, in reality'sideways' mobility represents an importantcomponent of job-tjob flows.
18On-the-job search has very little effect on the benchmark equilibrium. Poor workers never
search while employed. Instead, they supply a lot of labor, and gradually increase theirasset
holdings. When assets exceed a threshold value, they switch their activity from all-work to
all-search.19 Assets immediately decline, so if their searchwas unsuccessful, they resume
working in the bad job the following period. Workers in bad jobs spend about 2% of their
time endowment, roughly 1 hour per week, searching. Effectively, on-the-job search allows
workers to quit bad jobs and search, with a guarantee of being able to return to their old
job should their search fail. Because bad jobs are easy to get, this option is not worthvery
much, so on-the-job search has little effect on the equilibrium of the model.
On-the-job search has a similarly small effect on the "High UI" and "Long UI"parame-
terizations, and does not affect our main results. However, it has a fairly large effect on the
parameterization without any UI. The wealthiest workers in bad jobs look for good ones.
When they find them, they save a lot, enough to he willing to look fora good job when they
lose their job. As a result, over a third of jobs are good in the resulting equilibrium, and the
cost of not having any UI is substantially smaller than in a world without on-the-job search.
The behavior of the economy without UI seems more plausible here than in the benchmark
model.
6 Concluding Comments
Conventional wisdom views unemployment insurance as a serious distortion thatwe have
to live with in order to smooth income risk and consumption variability In thispaper, we
have argued that moderate unemployment insurancemay actually improve the allocation of
resources. Unemployment insurance enables workers to pursue riskier options, including jobs
that are harder to get, but possibly also more productive. As a result, moderate UImay
raise output by improving the composition of jobs. In practice, however, this effect of UI
may be outweighed by the traditional moral hazard cost: insured workers search less hard
for jobs, and therefore spend more time unemployed. Moreover, one mightconjecture that
the importance of uninsured risks is limited in a dynamiceconomy, because workers can self-
insure by building up buffer stocks of assets. To investigate the quantitative importance of
these opposing forces, we constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model in which workers
make search effort, savings, and job application decisions. Although the decisions inquestion
are complex, our model is sparse, enabling us to calibrate the few parameters to U.S. data, in
particular to the labor market for high school graduates. The model performs well not only
19This switching behavior may seem extreme, but would be more reasonable witha shorter period length.
For example, a worker takes an afternoon off to look for a better job. Anotherway to obtain more reasonable
conclusions, would be to introduce exogenous restrictions on minimum working hours, which would make
the model behave more like the benchmark.
19along the dimensions in which it is calibrated, but in a number of other dimensions as well,
including the standard deviation of annual income, the decline in consumption following job
loss, and the responsiveness of unemployment duration and wages to the magnitude and
duration of unemployment benefits.
Armed with the confidence that this model captures some of the tradeoffs facedby
workers in real labor markets, we investigated the implications of different UI policieson
unemployment, output, labor productivity, and welfare. We find that reducing UI from
its current U.S.levelwould reduce both risk sharing and total consumption. Conversely,
moderate increases in UI raise output and improve risk sharing.
As this is a calibration exercise, our results are necessarily sensitive toparameter choices.
To address this issue, we verified the robustness of our results to several keyparameter
changes. A complementary strategy would be to look for direct evidence that moregenerous
unemployment insurance programs encourage the creation of more specialized and higher
productivity jobs. At a more general level, we believe that more work needs to be done to
understand the role and optimal design of UI programs. Labor market reform is a key issue
in Europe. Social insurance programs, especially UIprograms, are likely to be modified
during the next decade. Similar reforms are underway in the U.S.. If we are correct that
social insurance programs have a beneficial effect not only on welfare but also onoutput
and productivity, the relevant reforms may have very different implications thancurrently
envisioned.
Finally, we have assumed that UI is provided by the government. Why unemployment
insurance is almost always publicly provided, in contrast to most other insurancecontracts,
remains an important, unresolved question.2° The answer will likely be relevant to the
optimal design of unemployment insurance programs.
20For recent work on this topic, see Chiu and Karni (1998).
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Column IColumn II Column III Column IV





0.4 0.44 0.4 0
25 25 27.8
0.022 0.025 0.023 0
16.5 16.8 17.0 7.1
Fraction of Good Jobs
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Duration
Std. Dev. of Log Weekly Income
51.5% 56.1% 54.2% 0%
6.3% 6.7% 6.5% 1.1%
13.5 14.5 14.0 2.2
0.133 0.132 0.132 0.002
Work Hours in Good Jobs
Work Hours in Bad Jobs
Search Hours by Insured
Search Hours by Uninsured
0.862 0.861 0.862
0.859 0.859 0.859 0.858
0.816 0.809 0.814 —
0.866 0.866 0.866 0.895
Consump. Drop Following Job Loss
Std. Dev. of Log Annual Income
15.2% 15.4% 15.4% 10.2%





1.155 1.169 1.163 1.000
0.931 0.938 0.935 0.849
0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142
0.651 0.655 0.654 0.611
Table 2: Results in the benchmark parameterization, and for three alternative UI schemes.
25Variable
Column IColumn II Column III Column IV





0.4 044 0.4 0
25 25 27.8 —
0.025 0.031 0.027 0
16.2 15.5 16.1 7.1
Fraction of Good Jobs
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Duration
Std. Dev. of Log Weekly Income
53.0% 55.4% 53.8% 0%
7.3% 8.0% 7.7% 1.0%
15.8 17.5 16.6 2.0
0.138 0.138 0.138 0.008
Work Hours in Good Jobs
Work Hours in Bad Jobs
Search Hours by Insured
Search Hours by Uninsured
0.866 0.865 0.866
0.855 0.854 0.855 0.853
0.672 0.624 0.663 —
0.886 0.893 0.888 0.971
Consump. Drop Following Job Loss
Std. Dev. of Log Annual Income
22.4% 24.2% 24.0% 4.2%





1.160 1.168 1.162 1
0.926 0.923 0.924 0.844
0.150 0.155 0.151 0146
0.446 0.446 0.446 0.419
Table 3: Results with a high value of leisure, 77= 1
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0.4 0.44 0.4 0
25 25 27.8 —
0.023 0.026 0.024 0
27.1 26.9 27.1 27.1
Fraction of Good Jobs
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Duration
Std. Dev. of Log Weekly Income
46.5% 49.2% 48.8% 0%
6.3% 6.5% 6.4% 3.7%
13.5 14.0 13.7 7.6
0.070 0.070 0.070 0.005
Work Hours in Good Jobs
Work Hours in Bad Jobs
Search Hours by Insured
Search Hours by Uninsured
0.860 0.860 0.860
0.859 0.859 0.859 0.860
0.822 0.816 0.820
0.875 0.878 0.875 0.873
Consump. Drop Following Job Loss
Std. Dev. of Log Annual Income
15.0% 15.3% 15.1% 12.2%





1.070 1.074 1.073 1
0.862 0.863 0.863 0.828
0.142 0.143 0.142 0.140
0.608 0.609 0.610 0.588
Table 4: Results with low wage dispersion, w9= 1.15
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0.4 0.44 0.4 0
25 25 27.8
0.025 0.033 0.028 0
5.8 6.0 5.9 5.8
Fraction of Good Jobs
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Duration
Std. Dev. of Log Weekly Income
33.8% 46,7% 38.3% 0%
6.4% 7.7% 6.9% 2.6%
13.7 16.8 14.7 5.4
0.066 0.070 0.068 0.004
Work Hours in Good Jobs
Work Hours in Bad Jobs
Search Hours by Insured
Search Hours by Uninsured
0.859 0.859 0.859
0.859 0.859 0.859 0.859
0.828 0.821 0.827
0.921 0.921 0.922 0.910
Consump. Drop Following Job Loss
Std. Dev. of Log Annual Income
27.7% 27.9% 27.9% 28.6%





1.051 1.070 1.057 1
0.845 0.848 0.846 0.836
0.142 0.143 0.142 0.140
0.603 0.604 0.604 0.598
Table 5: Results with low risk aversion,
28
8=1.Variable
Column IColumn II Column III Column IV





0.4 0.44 0.4 0
25 25 27.8 —
0.021 0.025 0.022 0
17.8 17.5 18.0 15.0
Fraction of Good Jobs
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Duration
Std. Dev. of Log Weekly Income
61.1% 63.1% 62.9% 37.4%
6.4% 6.7% 6.6% 3.2%
13.7 14.5 14.2 6.6
0.212 0.208 0.168 0.199
Work Hours in Good Jobs
Work Hours in Bad Jobs
Search Hours in Bad Jobs
Search Hours by Insured
Search Hours by Uninsured
0.862 0.861 0.862 0.863
0.839 0.840 0.839 0.835
0.020 0.021 0.022 0.027
0.818 0.810 0.816
0.865 0.865 0.865 0.864
Consump. Drop Following Job Loss
Std. Dcv. of Log Annual Income
15.6% 15.9% 16.7% 13.0%





1.185 1.191 1.190 1.115
0.946 0.948 0.949 0.912
0.142 0.141 0.138 0.862
0.659 0.660 0.660 0.637












Figure2: An increase in unemployment income flattens workers' indifference curves, from the





















Figure 3: Consumption as a function of normalized assets in the four employment states,
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Figure 4: Hours of search or labor supply as a function of normalized assets in the four
employment states, benchmark parameterization. Note that workers quit bad jobs when
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Figure6: Ergodic distribution of asset holdings, benchmark parameterization.
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